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MARGINAL SOCIAL COST PRICING FOR ALL 
TRANSPORT MODES AND THE EFFECTS OF MODAL 
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS   1
  Marginal Social Cost Pricing for all Transport modes 
and the effects of modal budget constraints  
 




This paper studies the order of magnitude of the pricing corrections that are needed to implement 
marginal social cost pricing for all transport modes. With the TRENEN model we study this question 
for 6 areas in the EU. As marginal social cost pricing may generate important surpluses and deficits for 
the different modes, we also study the effects of two alternative pricing rules that satisfy budget 
constraints. We examine the effects of average cost pricing that guarantees a budget balance  per mode. 
The second alternative pricing rule we study is social Ramsey pricing (or marginal social cost pricing 
with a budget constraint) where we impose a budget constraint at the level of the transport sector. We 
estimate transport effects and welfare effects of the three pricing rules. We show that average pricing 
rules may actually do worse than the present pricing rules and that social Ramsey pricing may achieve 




Transport pricing, optimal taxes, externalities, transport budget constraints 
                                                           
1 Stef Proost, Center for Economic Studies, KULeuven, and Kurt Van Dender, University of California 
at Irvine    2
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the effects of more efficient pricing in the transport sector. The 
introduction of road pricing is a central component of social marginal cost pricing, but 
it is not the only one, as other modes, like rail and urban public transport, need 
important pricing corrections as well.
2 Correcting the prices on one market and not 
others may decrease the overall welfare gain, or even decrease welfare.   
The first objective of this paper is to estimate, for the transport sector as a whole, the 
magnitude of the required price corrections, as well as their effects on traffic flows, 
government revenues and welfare.  Marginal social cost pricing is often considered as 
an exercise of academic nature with little political relevance. When proposals for 
substantial pricing reforms in the transport sector are discussed, one of the major 
counterarguments used by interest groups is the risk for unbalanced budgets between 
transport modes.  There is a general fear that taxes on car use would indeed strongly 
increase, and the receipts would be used to fill the larger deficits in the public 
transport sectors. Car lobby groups will therefore typically require that all modes 
balance their budgets.  
This call for budget equilibrium is motivated in several ways. First, there is the 
efficiency concern that prices below average costs lead to excessive use of a 
commodity. Second, there is the cost-efficiency concern that the absence of a rigid 
balanced budget requirement for a mode like rail acts like a blank check so that 
production operations will become less cost-efficient. Third, there is a fear of loss of 
                                                           
2 See Glaister and Lewis (1978) for an early application of optimal pricing with 
several modes. 
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transparency. Finally, there are concerns regarding unacceptable transfers between 
population groups. 
The second objective of this chapter is to assess the effects of balanced budget 
requirements.  More specifically, the efficiency- and transport sector effects of three 
alternative pricing schemes are discussed. We compare existing pricing practices with 
marginal social cost pricing (MSC) and with two pricing rules that guarantee a 
balanced budget. The first is simple average cost pricing for each mode (ACM), the 
second is Ramsey pricing with budget equilibrium for the whole transport sector 
(RMS). Both average cost pricing and Ramsey pricing are deviations from marginal 
social cost pricing, for which we want to gauge the extent of the revenue effects as 
well as the potential efficiency losses of imposing budget constraints in the transport 
sector. This exercise could be considered as an input into a broader analysis that uses 
a political economy approach (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2001), where issues like 
earmarking of tax revenues
3 and efficiency incentives for the transport ministries (in 
the sense of Tirole, 1994) are studied. 
The computations are done for a set of European cities and non-urban areas, 
always using the same aggregate optimal pricing model. We focus on pricing reform 
for given infrastructure, excluding the investment problem. Moreover, it is assumed 
that all transport is produced in a cost-efficient way, so that any cost-efficiency 
concern generated by budget balance requirements is ignored.
4  Finally, income 
distribution concerns between population groups are ignored, as this requires a 
general equilibrium approach that keeps track of the use of transport revenue 
surpluses or deficits in other sectors of the economy (Mayeres and Proost, 1997 and 
2003). 
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The pricing rules considered in this chapter are defined in Section 2. The model is 
described briefly in Section 3. The reference equilibrium and the budget constraints 
are discussed in Section 4. The effects of the different pricing rules are compared in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2  WHICH PRICING RULES ARE COMPARED? 
Three pricing rules are tested. As shown in Table 1 they differ in two characteristics: 
(i) whether they need to balance the financial transport account or not, and (ii) 
whether they use marginal social cost information or not. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 It is well known in the theory of incentives that a regulation scheme that imposes a maximum deficit 
can generate production efficiency (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993).   5
Table 1:  Transport Pricing Rules 
Pricing principle  Balanced modal transport 
account or financial cost 
recovery  
Average cost  Marginal cost 
Required by transport 
mode 
Average cost pricing 
(ACM) 
 
Required for transport 
sector  
  Ramsey social cost pricing 
(RMS) 
Not required    Marginal social cost pricing 
(MSC) 
   6
When the average cost pricing by mode (ACM) rule is used, prices are equal to 
the sum of financial costs of that mode divided by its total volume. This implies that 
no attention is paid to the structure of resource costs (fixed or not, sunk or not, etc.), 
no consideration of any external costs is made, and all transport services (freight, 
passengers etc.) within that mode are treated identically. The main goal of average 
cost pricing is cost recovery. There are many forms of average cost pricing because 
both the numerator and the denominator are to some extent arbitrary. First, several 
volume indicators can be used, e.g. trips or vehicle kilometer for passengers and 
tonkilometer or vehiclekilometer for freight.  Second, accounting rules are not 
uniform (depreciation rules etc.) and can lead to different total cost concepts; cf. e.g. 
Jha (1998).  We use only one of many definitions of average costs, as what matters is 
to show how important are cost recovery and the disregard of the resource cost and 
external cost structure (marginal costs by time of day etc.) for economic efficiency. 
When the marginal social cost pricing (MSC) rule is used, prices are equal to the 
sum of the marginal resource cost (extra cost of driver time, fuel, wear and tear of 
vehicle, all before taxes) and the marginal external cost (including congestion, air 
pollution, noise, accidents and maintenance cost of the infrastructure), for a given 
infrastructure. With this pricing rule, the financial impact per mode is ignored. 
When the Ramsey social cost pricing for the transport sector (RMS) rule is used, 
prices are set as optimal deviations from marginal social costs. The deviations are 
required to meet cost recovery targets for the transport sector as a whole. If marginal 
social cost pricing generates insufficient revenue to cover financial costs, RMS 
pricing requires that the margins (price-marginal social cost) are increased in a way 
that is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand in the relevant market. More 
over in setting the margins, care has to be taken of the potential distortionary effects   7
on other transport markets. This means that mark-ups on top of marginal social costs 
are differentiated between the different transport services (peak, off-peak, passengers, 
freight). This principle looks complicated but is well known in the theory of 
monopolistic pricing and is common practice in all businesses that exploit their 
market power (airlines, soft drinks, telecom, computers, private education, 
supermarkets, etc.
5). The main difference with our application is that private firms are 
not concerned with external costs. 
Many alternatives to the pricing rules defined above can be defined, and some 
may perform better than the ones discussed in this chapter. We mention two 
possibilities.  First, one could define the Ramsey pricing principle at the level of each 
mode and look for optimal differentiation between different services of the same 
mode (e.g. return or single ticket, etc.). This looks less interesting because the budget 
balance in this paper is not really imposed at the modal level; the model used here is 
multi-modal and rather aggregated.  Second, two-part tariffs may outperform Ramsey 
pricing. The reason why Ramsey pricing is considered instead of two-part tariffs is 
technical: the aggregate simulation model that is used does not allow the computation 
of the full benefits of two-part tariffs. A micro-simulation model based on 
representative samples would be needed in order to tackle that issue.
6  
3. THE MODEL 
The pricing rules are assessed using TRENEN, a multi-modal partial equilibrium 
model.
7 The model describes the market equilibrium for all surface transport markets 
simultaneously. It covers passengers and freight, and private and public transport 
                                                           
5 See any intermediate micro-economics textbook, e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001, p370-403)  
6 The design of optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities is discussed in De Borger 
(2001). 
7 For more details on the model. see Proost and Van Dender (2001a and 2001b).   8
modes. One of its main features is that it can optimize the pricing structure over 
several modes under any type of pricing constraint. There are different model versions 
for urban and for non-urban transport. We briefly describe the urban model version 
and focus on passenger transportation. Figure 1 shows the model structure. 
3.1 Assumptions 
Three important assumptions allow us to build a simple multi-modal model that can 
be used to compute optimal tax structures. The first assumption is that the travel 
conditions in the urban (non-urban) area can be represented by one aggregated speed-
flow relationship.
8  This means that area specific and route choice features cannot be 
studied. The second assumption is that demand is generated by a limited number of 
representative consumers.  The consequence is that distributional issues cannot be 
studied. The third assumption is that we use medium term static model. This means 
that  the level of all transport infrastructure is taken as given, but that the car stocks 
and public transport equipment (number of busses and rail carriages) fully adapt to the 
level of demand. 
3.2 The demand for transport  
The behaviour of a representative household is derived from the maximisation of an 
indirect utility function defined over generalized costs.  The indirect utility function 
takes a nested constant-elasticity of substitution form. This allows us to consider the 
choice between one aggregate non-transport good and 20 or so transport alternatives.
9 
The inclusion of the non-transport good allows total demand for transport to vary. The 
transport alternatives are combinations of mode, time of day and type of vehicle used, 
as shown in the utility tree in Figure 2.  
                                                           
8 This aggregate speed-flow relationship can be derived from a detailed network model (see 0’Mahony 
et al., 1997) 
9 Labour supply is kept fixed in the model as well as the total volume of production and the product 
price of general consumption goods  Endogenising these variables would lead to a full general   9
The choices of the representative consumer are driven by generalized prices. Through 
the time-component of these generalized prices, the effect of congestion on travel 
time and modal choice is taken into account. The generalised costs for public 
transport depend on the frequency of service, allowing us to take into account the 
Mohring effect (Mohring 1972).  
The demand for freight transport services is modelled by assuming that each firm 
minimises its total production cost for a given output level.  It can choose between 
non-transport inputs (labour, capital, other intermediate goods) and a wide range of 
transport inputs (different modes, times of day etc.). The behaviour of the firms is 
represented by a nested CES cost function that is defined over generalised costs, again 
taking account of traffic congestion. In a typical case study, a choice can be made 
between peak and off-peak freight, and in both periods different modes (rail, road, 
inland waterways) are available. Road freight can make use of light-duty and heavy-
duty trucks. 
3.3 Transport supply  
The supply side of the model is simple.   Supply is represented by cost functions.  In 
each transport market, marginal resource costs of inputs other than time are constant 
per vehicle-kilometre, but the marginal costs may differ across transport markets (i.e. 
across modes, time periods, vehicle types, etc.). In passenger car and lorry markets 
there are no fixed costs
10 and all inputs are supplied at the marginal resource cost plus 
tax. For collective transport markets we use a linear cost function. The constant term 
represents the fixed costs (e.g. administration costs, storage facilities, non-vehicle 
network costs). The variable term represents the rental costs of carriages and busses, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
equilibrium model. However, there is a trade-off here between the detail in the modeling of the 
transport sector and the coverage of the whole economy. 
10 In line with the medium run horizon of the model, car ownership costs are expressed on a 
per vehicle-kilometre basis.   10
as well as the costs of fuel and drivers. We assume a constant occupancy rate 
(different for peak and off-peak) so that we can define a marginal resource cost per 
passenger kilometre.  The frequency of service is taken to adapt in function of the 
total demand for public transport, so that the waiting time is variable.  Finally, the 
policy maker can affect environmental and other vehicle characteristics through 
regulations that affect the resource costs of vehicles. 
For the non-transport market, the producer prices equal the constant marginal resource 
cost plus tax. 
3.4 Calibraton and Operation of the model  
 
The model is calibrated to observed or forecasted transport volumes, prices and 
speeds in a given region. The model is completed by a speed flow relationship (that is 
best derived from experiments with a network model) and by resource cost and 
external cost functions for all transport modes. We select elasticities of substitution 
for the nested utility and cost functions so as to obtain price elasticities in line with the 
values reported in the literature. 
In simulation mode, the calibrated model computes the equilibrium for all the 
transport markets and for the non-transport commodity market, given a set of policy 
parameters (taxes, regulations on type of vehicles etc.). The equilibrium is 
characterised by a set of speeds, volumes and generalised costs such that no transport 
user wants to alter his choice. For this equilibrium the model computes external costs 
(air pollution, congestion, accidents, noise etc.) and a welfare indicator. The welfare 
indicator can loosely be described as
11 the sum of total consumer surplus on the 
transport markets, producer surplus (the negative of the total production costs of firms 
                                                           
11 The welfare indicator in fact equals the sum of the indirect utility levels of the representative 
individuals who receive all profits in all firms as well as all net tax revenue, less the external costs other 
than congestion. This measure is more consistent than a simple sum of consumer surpluses on markets.   11
and the deficit or surplus of the public transport firms) and total net tax revenue, 
minus external costs other than congestion (congestion is included in the consumer 
surplus defined over generalised prices).   
We can also use the model in optimization mode, by maximizing the welfare indicator 
under pricing constraints that represent the allowed pricing instruments. Only if there 
are no constraints on the tax differentiation over different markets will the derived 
optimum correspond to marginal social cost pricing. In most applications one is 
forced to compute second best optima. It is well known that this can be numerically 
difficult and can generate counter-intuitive results. When every pricing solution is 
multi-dimensional (e.g., taxes for twenty transport markets), the best constrained 
solution can not be found using an ad hoc search procedure  
 The standard version of TRENEN contains no (balanced) budget requirement in any 
transport market or in any combination of transport markets. Instead, changes in tax 
revenues as caused by changes in transport policy are valued exogenously, and the 
exogenous value reflects an assumption on revenue use. For the purposes of this 
chapter, tax revenues get the same weight as consumer income.  In this chapter, the 
optimization model will be used to compute the marginal social cost pricing solution 
(no constraint on tax instruments), the Ramsey pricing solution (the total tax revenue 
of the transport sector is constrained so that taxes in the transport sector have to be 
adjusted away from the MSC value) and the average cost pricing solution. In the latter 
solution all taxes will be constrained to equal the average resource cost.  Remember 
that average cost is itself not constant so this is not a straightforward computation. 
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Figure 1 Model structure 
Figure 2 The nested utility tree for the behaviour of urban households (only the 
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4  AVERAGE COST POLICY SCENARIOS AND THE REFERENCE 
EQUILIBRIA 
4.1 Construction of the policy scenarios 
The data used for calibrating the models were originally collected for a study on the 
public revenue effects of optimal pricing (Roy, 2000). That study collected data sets 
for different countries, including traffic flows, prices, taxes and marginal external 
costs.  
The first step in the construction of a policy scenario for ACM and RMS is to 
determine the revenues that need to be raised through transport taxes. Our data sets 
for Germany and the UK provide information on the cost side for collective transport 
modes and include: urban metro, tram and bus, and non-urban bus and train, for 1995 
and 2005. This information is sufficient to determine the revenue requirements for 
those modes, excluding road network costs. 
Information on road network costs is harder collect. We made an estimate on the 
basis of Link and Suter (2001) and  analogous  assumptions are made for the UK. The 
values derived for total road infrastructure costs are very uncertain, but they are not 
crucial for the results.  
Once the revenue requirements are determined, the scenarios can be designed. 
They are shown on Table 2.   14
Table 2:  Policy Scenarios 
Scenario Details   
The reference equilibrium (REF) 
 
This scenario uses the expected reference 
prices for 2005 in all transport markets. It 
serves as the benchmark to which the 
remaining scenarios are compared. 
 
Average cost pricing (ACM) 
 
Here the modal budget is financed by a 
uniform tax per vehicle kilometre for the 
private modes and by uniform tax per 
passenger kilometre or ton kilometre  for 
all public transport  modes 
 
Ramsey social pricing (RMS) 
 
The transport-sector-wide budget of total 
costs is financed through Ramsey taxes, 
allowing full differentiation across 
transport markets. The taxes maximise 
social welfare subject to the budget 
constraint. The social welfare function 
takes all external costs into account, so 
that optimal prices will be optimal 
deviations of marginal costs, where 
deviations are necessary to meet the 
revenue requirements. 
 
Marginal social cost pricing (MSC). 
 
This is the theoretical optimum obtained 
by maximisation of the welfare function, 
allowing full differentiation of taxes 
across transport markets, without any 
budget constraint. 
 
4.2 Taxes and Marginal External Costs in the Reference Equilibrium 
Table 3 compares the reference taxes to total marginal external costs (TMEC). These 
are equal to the sum of marginal congestion costs (MCC) and other marginal external 
costs such as pollution for small gasoline cars and diesel buses, accidents and noise 
(MEPD). Taxes and marginal external costs of four transport alternatives are shown in 
Table 3. The values correspond to a small petrol car with one driver-occupant and a 
representative bus at peak and off-peak times.  The taxes considered include taxes on 
car ownership and on use of cars (fuel taxes, existing tolls, additional VAT etc.), for   15
public transport the tax equals the difference between the ticket price and the marginal 
resource cost. A negative tax is a subsidy. 
Marginal external congestion costs clearly dominate in peak periods.
12 In order to 
assess the pricing inefficiencies we compare the per passenger kilometre total tax 
(“Tax” in first column) with the total  marginal external costs (TMEC in second 
column). We see that the total marginal external costs exceed taxes in all urban areas 
during peak hours. It is evident from the table that current taxes more than cover the 
external costs in urban areas during off-peak periods and in interurban areas at all 
times including peak times (see Proost et al, 2002 for more evidence). We see that 
there also inefficiencies for the public transport modes. With one exception, public 
transport prices are too low in the peak and may be too high or too low in the off 
peak. This may illustrate the second best policy of subsidising public transport to 
reduce the problems in the underpriced peak car market. Policy makers often do not 
appreciate that the introduction of road pricing may be an opportunity to correct the 
public transport prices as well. 
  The difference between taxes and total marginal external costs is as such 
insufficient to compute optimal taxes. The marginal external cost (mainly the 
congestion cost) is a function of the volume of transportation and this is a function of 
the tax itself so that one tends to overstate the necessary increase in taxes when using 
the marginal external cost information in the reference situation as a guideline.  
                                                           
12 Note the high estimate for marginal external congestion costs for Munster. This follows 
from the small geographical scope of this case, and it explains the high welfare gains from 
MSC-pricing.   16
Table 3:   Marginal External Costs and Tax Levels in the Reference Situation – 
Partial Equilibrium Model (EURO/Passenger kilometre, 2005) 
  Peak car  Off-peak car 
 Tax  TMEC  MCC  MEPD  Tax  TMEC  MCC  MEPD 
Germany: 
   Düsseldorf 
   München 
   Münster 
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  Peak bus  Off-peak bus 
 Tax  TMEC  MCC  MEPD  Tax  TMEC  MCC  MEPD 
Germany: 
   Düsseldorf 
   München 
   Münster 
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Legend: (all in EURO per passenger kilometre) 
Tax  = total amount of taxes paid  
TMEC = MCC+MEPD = total marginal external cost   
MCC = Marginal external congestion cost 
MEPD= Marginal external cost other than congestion  
Source: Own calculations 
Note: negative taxes are subsidies (=marginal resource cost – price)   17
5 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE PRICING RULES 
This section discusses the main effects of the alternative pricing rules. 
5.1  Optimal Transport Taxes in Different Pricing Schemes 
Table 4 presents an overview of the tax levels in car
13 and public transport markets, 
for the various policy scenarios. First, compare the two pricing rules that meet the 
budget requirement, ACM and RMS, to the reference situation (REF).  Clearly, 
achieving cost recovery by mode through average cost pricing (ACM) leads to 
substantial car tax reductions and (very) large bus tax increases in all cases. The 
resulting change in relative prices of private and public modes leads to an increase in 
the modal share of cars (cf. Table 5c).  Combined with the small increase in peak 
period traffic volumes (cf. Tables 5a and 5b), this exacerbates congestion and other 
external costs. Allowing the same budget to be raised by a Ramsey-rule (RMS) avoids 
these problems, as it always leads to lower bus taxes relative to car taxes. In most 
cases, the Ramsey bus taxes are lower than the ACM bus taxes in absolute terms as 
well. This price differentiation shows that, even in the presence of a cost recovery 
rule, price differentiation under a RMS scenario may generate substantial welfare 
gains. Note that in the case of Münster the Ramsey rule even calls for subsidising off-
peak car travel.  This is an extreme case of a second-best policy geared towards 
reducing peak period car use. Although the TRENEN model allows for this 
theoretical possibility, such a pricing system may not be a realistic policy option. 
Second, compare the reference situation to MSC pricing.  Although the optimal 
taxes under marginal social cost pricing (MSC) usually are higher than the reference 
                                                           
13 Car taxes slightly differ in the peak and off peak period even though the tax system does 
not distinguish between times of day. The difference is made by the TRENEN model, which 
takes into account the difference in fuel consumption between peak and off-peak.   18
taxes for peak period car trips, there are exceptions, such as South-East England, 
which has low average congestion levels in the reference equilibrium. The impact on 
off-peak car taxes is more diverse: in both regions, Westphalen and South-East 
England, the off-peak car taxes decrease. In all cities except London, car taxes 
increased in comparison to the reference equilibrium. This result may be driven by the 
geographical scale of the case studies, as those cases covering the largest areas have 
decreasing off-peak taxes. Taking large networks into account may tend to spread out 
off-peak congestion levels.   19
Table .4:   Tax Levels for Different Pricing Scenarios, 2005 
(EURO/PKM)  Peak car  Off-peak car 
  REF  ACM RMS MSC REF  ACM RMS MSC 
Germany: 
   Düsseldorf 
   München 
   Münster 
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  Peak bus  Off-peak bus 
  REF  ACM RMS MSC REF  ACM RMS MSC 
Germany: 
   Düsseldorf 
   München 
   Münster 
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Source: Own calculations 
Note: PKM: Passenger-kilometre   20
5.2  Traffic Level and Composition 
Tables 5a,.5b and 5c show the impact of the pricing mechanisms on traffic levels 
(passenger car units, PCU), on transport demand (passenger-kilometre, PKM), and on 
modal shares, respectively. Average cost pricing leads to an increase in traffic levels 
and transport demand, because the taxes are on average reduced with respect to the 
reference situation. The increase in PCU is larger than for PKM because of a modal 
shift towards car trips (Table 5c), away from collective modes, as a consequence of 
the relatively high revenue requirement (hence, relatively high taxes) for collective 
modes, and the relatively low revenue requirement in car markets.  This illustrates 
that defining budget requirements in narrow sets of transport markets may have strong 
effects on modal split. The simple average cost pricing scheme performs badly both in 
terms of aggregate travel demand and in terms of modal split for a given level of 
demand.
14  
Ramsey social pricing, on the other hand, manages to combine lower PCU levels 
(hence less congestion) with increased transport demand in a number of cases: 
Düsseldorf, München, London, and to a lesser extent, the region of Westphalen. The 
reason is that, despite the low revenue requirements, relative modal prices can be set 
to achieve a good modal split. In practice this requires low or zero fares for collective 
modes. In other cases, such as Münster and the South-East region in the UK, the 
revenue requirement is too low to allow for sufficient price differentiation, and 
increased PCU levels result. 
Marginal social cost pricing usually reduces travel demand (PKM) and traffic 
flows (PCU) in comparison to the reference situation, and  leads to revenues in excess 
of the revenue requirements specified for average cost pricing and Ramsey social   21
pricing. Under marginal social cost pricing there is no longer a justification for 
subsidising public transport beyond the level of fixed costs.
15 The efficient modal split 
is obtained by pricing all modes at their marginal social cost. 
Table 6 shows the share of trips (measured in PCUs) that take place during peak 
hours. As can be seen this share is less sensitive to the pricing scheme than is the total 
traffic volume. Ramsey social pricing performs much like marginal social cost pricing 
in this respect, through a second best correction of prices. The effect of average cost 
pricing is to slightly decrease the share of peak hour trips in most cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 Although not computed, it is likely that a Ramsey pricing scheme with modal budget constraints – as 
opposed to a sector-wide constraint – will suffer from the same problem, to a lesser – but still 
considerable – extent. 
15 The economics of density in public transport or Mohring effect is the exception. If the 
frequency of service increases due to additional passengers, there is a positive externality in 
public transport. The marginal social cost thus equals the sum of the marginal operating costs 
and the marginal external costs (congestion, air pollution, accidents) minus the external 
benefit of a more frequent service.  Van Dender and Proost (2001) find that taking account of 
this positive externality has limited effects on the welfare potential of pricing reforms, but that 
it decreases fare revenues while public transport expenditures increase.   22
Table 5a:  Traffic Level Index (PCU) under Different Pricing Scenarios. 2005 
 REF  ACM  RMS  MSC 
Germany 
   Düsseldorf  1  1.13  0.95  0.91 
   München  1  1.12  0.97  0.88 
   Münster  1  1.07  1.07  0.90 
   Westphalen 
region 
1  1.03 0.99 0.99 
UK 
   London  1  1.06  0.91  0.76 
   South east region  1  1.11  1.04  1.01 
 
Source: Own calculations   23
Table 5b:  Transport Demand Index (PKM) under Different Pricing Scenarios, 
2005 
 REF  ACM  RMS  MSC 
Germany 
   Düsseldorf  1  1.05  1.04  0.92 
   München  1  1.05  1.03  0.94 
   Münster  1  1.03  1.10  0.95 
   Westphalen 
region 
1  0.98 1.08 1.01 
UK 
   London  1  1.03  1.11  0.88 
   South east region  1  0.96  1.03  1.00 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 5c: Modal Share of Car in Peak and Off-Peak (%)  under Different Pricing 
Scenarios, 2005 
  Peak car share  Off-peak car share 
 REF  ACM  RMS  MSC  REF  ACM  RMS  MSC 
Germany: 
   Düsseldorf 
   München 
   Münster 
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Source: Own calculations   24
In the urban case studies, the impact of the different pricing schemes on freight 
transport is small, and the directions of change are similar to those of passenger car 
transport. In regional contexts, average cost pricing decreases the modal share of rail 
freight, in comparison to the reference situation. Ramsey social pricing does the 
opposite: it strongly pushes the share of rail up. In the Westphalen case, Ramsey 
social pricing leads to a much higher share of rail freight than in the marginal social 
cost pricing scenario. In the South-East UK case, the Ramsey share is approximately 
equal to the marginal social cost pricing share. Overall, the impact of the various 
schemes on aggregate freight demand is rather small.   25
Table 6:  Share of Peak Period PCU, 2005 
  % under REF  % under ACM  % under RMS  % underMSC 
Germany       
   Düsseldorf  63.3  61.0  62.1  62.2 
   München  58.7  56.9  57.5  58.0 
   Münster  59.1  58.3  55.0  56.5 
   Westphalen region  64.0  64.0  63.7  63.3 
UK       
   London  68.1  66.9  68.0  69.1 
   South east region  69.5  69.8  69.3  69.3 
   26
5.3 Welfare  Impacts 
Table 7 shows the welfare changes induced by the different pricing scenarios for the 
various cases.  These welfare changes are expressed as a percentage of total 
generalized income and this is larger than national income. A welfare gain of 1% of 
generalized income realized on the transport market that only counts for 10% or less 
of total national income is therefore to be considered as important. Of course, 
marginal social cost pricing outperforms Ramsey social cost pricing, which in turn 
outperforms average cost pricing. First, the introduction of a budget constraint has a 
clear efficiency cost for the transport sector. Second, the way in which this constraint 
is met has further consequences for the welfare effects. Ramsey social pricing cannot 
be worse than average cost pricing and cannot be better than marginal social cost 
pricing. 
Interestingly, average cost pricing leads to a reduction of welfare with respect to 
the reference situation in all cases. While the size of the reduction varies substantially 
between cases, the two basic reasons for the welfare reductions are the same.   27
Table.7:  Welfare Impacts of Pricing Scenarios, % change with respect to REF, 
2005)  
 REF  ACM  RMS  MSC 
Germany 
   Düsseldorf  0  -0.79  +0.09  +0.14 
   München  0  -0.61  +0.14  +0.41 
   Münster  0  -2.45  -2.15  +2.45 
   Westphalen 
region 
0 -0.17 -0.06 +0.09 
UK 
   London  0  -0.76  +1.28  +2.70 
   South east region  0  -1.89  +0.18  +0.55 
 
Source: Own calculations   28
First, the current transport prices go some way towards a second-best pricing 
structure. Under-priced passenger car transport (from the social point of view) is often 
combined with subsidised public transport, so that relative price distortions are 
reduced. Such a policy is not feasible under the modal budget requirements used in 
the average cost pricing simulations. Taxes for each mode are only determined by the 
modal revenue requirement, so that no account can be taken of prices in substitute 
modes. 
Second, the modal budget constraints require less revenue than is raised in the 
reference situation. This means that the revenues from current transport taxes are 
higher than what is required to balance the transport sector financially. Optimal 
commodity tax theory shows that, if transport demand is relatively inelastic, revenue-
raising in that sector tends to limit the efficiency cost of collecting the required total 
amount of government revenue.
16 The fact that the transport sector at present is 
‘revenue positive’ may then be justified from the optimal taxation point of view, 
although there is no guarantee that relative prices or the size of the surplus are 
anywhere near optimal. 
If the revenue requirement were increased above the transport-related 
requirement, average cost pricing could, but need not, perform better than the 
reference price structure. As the peak-period taxes from average cost pricing approach 
the peak period external costs, the performance of ACM improves. This improvement 
will be counteracted to some extent by the growing deviation between off-peak taxes 
and off-peak external costs.
17 However, since peak-period congestion costs are the 
                                                           
16 The potential interactions with other distorted markets such as the labour market are 
ignored in this study; cf. Mayeres and Proost (1997), Parry and Bento (2001) and Van Dender 
(2003) for analyses of this issue. 
17 Sensitivity analysis for the Düsseldorf case shows that increasing the revenue requirement 
to 150% of the central case actually decreases the performance of AC in terms of welfare. 
Decreasing the revenue requirement to 50% of the central scenario improves the performance   29
dominant externality, a net improvement of welfare should be expected. Ramsey 
social pricing is better or worse than the reference situation depending on the case 
considered. The problem of reducing the amount of revenue to be raised, as compared 
to the reference situation, is less prominent here, as price differentiation is still 
possible. Second-best relative price structures are still a feasible policy option. It 
should be noted however that Ramsey social pricing performs considerably worse 
than marginal social cost pricing in all cases. This result suggests that the level of the 
revenue requirement is an important co-determinant of the welfare effects of transport 
pricing policies. Raising no more revenue than the one required for infrastructure 
financing (keeping the level of road infrastructure constant) may strongly reduce the 
welfare potential of pricing policies aimed at internalising externalities. 
The variation in results between cases depends on the degree of cost coverage of 
collective modes in the reference situation, and on the degree to which the new budget 
constraint allows sufficient differentiation of prices with respect to transport 
externalities. The high welfare gains for Munster have to do with the very steep speed 
flow relationship in the reference equilibrium. This implies that small reductions in 
volumes in the peak can generate important increases in speed and in welfare for the 
local population. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analysed the potential of more efficient pricing for the transport 
sector as a whole and the impact of budget constraints. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of AC. These however, are not general results. In a second sensitivity analysis, the budgets 
were linked to changes in traffic levels. At the central scenario revenue requirement, this 
decreases the performance of AC. At 50% of the central scenario requirement, this link 
increases the performance of AC. The relation between changes in the budget requirement 
and the performance of AC is clearly non-monotonous. Interactions between budgets, the   30
Implementing marginal social cost pricing without budget constraints generates in 
principle the highest welfare gains. This pricing reform requires important changes for 
for the road sector (road pricing etc.) but also for the public transport modes where in 
many regions peak tariffs need to be increased. Overall mobility needs to decrease by 
5 to 10% and modal shares of cars will go down in the peak.    
We studied to extreme scenarios to add a balanced budget constraint to the overall 
transport pricing reform. The first is simple average cost pricing per mode. The  
second is Ramsey pricing with a budget constraint for the transport sector as a whole. 
The comparison of transport pricing approaches shows that Ramsey-type pricing rules 
perform significantly better in terms of welfare than average cost based rules, and that 
the absence of a modal budget constraint allows to better adapt prices to marginal 
social cost.  
The case studies suggest that the quantitative effects may be important. Requiring 
that modal budgets are met exactly through average cost pricing reduces welfare in 
comparison to the reference situation, in all cases studied by 0.5 to more than 2.5% of 
national income. When the budget constraint is attained through Ramsey taxes, the 
results are most often welfare improving compared to the reference. The welfare cost 
of imposing the budget constraint, however, remains substantial in comparison to a 
marginal social cost pricing scheme. 
These results as such say nothing about the political and social feasibility of the 
various pricing rules. Furthermore, there are other ways of defining average cost 
pricing schemes than the ones analysed here, and such alternative definitions may 
produce better results. These alternative schemes will however become more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
implied ratio of modal and time-of-day differentiation of taxes, and changes in the budget 
requirement, may produce counterintuitive results.   31
complex, and they will still perform worse than marginal-cost-based pricing 
approaches. 
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